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Defendants.

This is an appeal from the trial court's erroneous grant of Summary
Judgment in favor of me defendants. The court granted summary judgment allegedly
due to two reasons: (1) The plaintiff failed to properly serve the city and county clerks
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1998) rather than the 1997 version which was
relied on by Plaintiff at the time delivering his Notices of Claim.

The court accepted the defendants' arguments that they did not receive any notice of die
claims; and (2) the court accepted the defendants' erroneous computation of time. The
court bought the argument that the Court should find that the Plaintiff was one day late
filing his Complaint with the district court by applying Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1
(1953, as amended) and then computed the date of delivery to be the date of so-called
mailing. The date that Plaintiff shipped the notices via U.S. Express Mail1 was June
6th, 1996. The Plaintiff intended die notices to be delivered on the 7th of June-to meet
the one-year filing deadline for notices of claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3013 (1953, as amended).
The Plaintiff was severely prejudiced by the court when it accepted the
defendants arguments. Firsdy, the Plaintiff did comply widi Section 63-30-11 by
delivering said notices of claim to me governing bodies' respective councils.
Secondly, the court violated me Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the
computation of time. The rule specifically disallows the inclusion of the "day of the
act, event, or default" in the computation of time. The court allowed such an inclusion
and found that the Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint timely by a day.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on uiis Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
1

Which the court should take judicial notice that the postmaster guarantees overnight delivery.
2

(1953, as amended) (2) (j) (cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court). The appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, in and for Utah County involving wrongful refusal to return personal
property in spite of a court order to do so.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Plaintiff complied with Section 63-30-11 (1997) by effecting

delivery to the defendant's "responsible governmental entities."
2.

Whether the Plaintiff effected delivery on June 7th, 1996 as guaranteed by

the courier U.S. Express Mail, or on June 6th, 1996 by mail pursuant to Section 63-371 1953, as amended).
3.

Whether the trial court erroneously computed the time for filing the

Plaintiffs Complaint.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The trial court misinterpreted and or otherwise misapplied Sections
63-30-11 and 63-37-1 against the Plaintiff and incorrectly computed the filing deadline
of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under
a correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d at 759.
3

State v. Bagshaw. 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must review
for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of the Fourth

District Court. The trial court granted summary judgment against the Plaintiff and in
favor of the defendants. The key issues are that the trial court incorrectly computed the
filing deadline for the Plaintiffs Complaint and prejudicially applied a modified
statutory provision that was not in effect at the time the Plaintiff had his notices of
claim delivered to the responsible governmental entities. At the February 2, 1999
hearing, the trial court demanded the Plaintiffs counsel to show the court how the

4

Plaintiff complied with Section 63-30-11 (1998).2 (H. at 30-39).3
77.

Course of the Proceedings:
On or about June 9, 1995, the defendants, by and through agents,

auctioned the Plaintiffs personal property without just compensation in violation of a
court order and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution, (R. at 3-4, 196198, 254; H. at 28). As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997), Mr.
Harward had prepared and delivered notices of claim to believed responsible
governmental entities, Utah County, Lehi City, Pleasant Grove City, and Provo City.
This was accomplished by not only serving them onto the city council. (R. at 118-130).
Facing a one-year deadline, on June 6th, 1996, the Plaintiff chose a courier who
guaranteed over-night delivery by 10:30 a.m. (H. at 28). All of the notices of claim
were to have their respective notices of claim delivered to them on June 7th, 1996. (R.
at 155, 157; H. at 10). With the guarantee, it is presumed tiiat the notices were all
delivered no later than that and certainly within 3 days to the deadline as the statute
required. If not delivered by June 9th, 1996, further proceeding by Plaintiff would be
time barred.

2

It was not then-known that a modification occurred during the course of the year.
Hence, counsel was not prepared to argue that point because it was not raised in the
defendant's dispositive motions.
3

The record does not have a continuous pagination for the Hearing transcript, it
simply has a paginated cover of 409. Therefore, for simplicity in briefing, any references
to the file will be cited as an "R" and citations to the transcript will be shown as an "H".
5

All of the defendants claimed that Plaintiffs delivery through a courier
other than certified or registered U.S. Mail constituted mailing anyway on that date
which would arguably mean that the date of delivery to the responsible governmental
entities was on June 6th, 1996 pursuant to Section 63-37-1 et seq. (R. at 110, 168, 205,
Pursuant to Utah Law, under Section 63-30-14, the plaintiff must then
allow the governmental entities 90 days to accept liability. Once the 90 days expires or
when the entities otherwise deny liability, the plaintiff must file his suit within one year
from that date or face being time-barred. The date of the expiration is the question
before this Court. The defendants all claim that none of them admitted liability and
they all deny submitting to Plaintiff rejection letters. Thus, the only issue is when the
actual 90 days expired. (R. at 262). The defendants all claim that the 90-days expired
ninety-days from June 6th, 1996 or September 4th, 1996.4 Id.
The Plaintiff relying on the plain language of Section 63-30-11, requiring
their "delivery" to the governmental bodies did not consider the claims delivered until
June 7th, 1996. The delivery of said notices is specifically required by Section 63-30-11
to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff did
not generally rely on other provisions outside of the Act. The defendants on the other
hand all argued that the Plaintiffs delivery of said notice was accomplished on June 6th,
4

Except for Pleasant Grove who interestingly attempts to purport even a need to
earlier file as soon as September 3rd, 1996. This argument was not adopted by the Court.
Such an argument disregarded the well-established computation rule not to include the date
of the "act, event, or default." See Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

1996 because of the general provision Section 63-37-1 et seq. The court ultimately
bought the argument and concluded that the Plaintiff delivered his notices of claim on
June 6th. (H. at 48-50). However, this notion is misplaced. In order for a party to
claim protection under Section 63-37-1, he needs to full compliance with the provisions
outlined in Section 63-37-2. The minimum requirements provide that the documents
need to be certified or registered mail delivered to the U.S. Mail with a follow up
within 30 days thereafter. (H. at 34). No such action was taken by die Plaintiff for the
defendants claim Section 63-37-l's application against the Plaintiff. As a matter of
fact, no defendant raised an affirmative defense a violation of Section 63-37-1. (H. at
25).
Thereafter, the Plaintiff had until September 5, 1997 in which to file his
Complaint. (R. at 157). However, according to the defendants' claim and the Court's
adopted position, the complaint allegedly should have been filed with the court on
September 4th, 1997. But as the Court put it, "it appears to me that 63-37-1 does
control in this case." (H. at 48). The court, however, has erred. The U.S. Express
Mail service is in direct competition with UPS, Federal Express, Airborne Express,
DHL, and other such courier services-just to name a few.

17/.

Disposition in Trial Court:
No trial occurred. On February 2, 1999, the trial court held a disposition

7

motions hearing. (R. at 323, 409). Consequently, the court held that Section 63-37-1
was controlling and he granted summary judgment for the defendants. (H. at 48).

IV.

Statement of Facts:
See part II above.5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court granted
summary judgment allegedly due to two reasons: (1) The plaintiff failed to properly
serve the city and county clerks pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1998). The
Plaintiff served the defendants' respective governing bodies pursuant to the 1997
version of said provision. The court accepted the defendants' arguments that they did
not receive any notice of the claims in spite of them being delivered to the city council
and their respective police chiefs.
Also, the court erroneously agreed with the defendants that Section
63-37-1 was controlling, which consequently affected the computation of time. The
court bought the argument that the Court should find that the Plaintiff was one day late
filing his Complaint with the district court by applying Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1
(1953, as amended) and then computed the date of delivery to be the date of so-called
s

The course of the proceedings is the nature of this appeal as this matter was
dismissed with the granting summary judgment for die defendants.
8

mailing. The date that Plaintiff shipped the notices via U.S. Express Mail6 was June
6th, 1996. The Plaintiff intended the notices to be delivered on the 7th of June-to meet
the one-year filing deadline for notices of claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3013 (1953, as amended) (the deadline was June 9th, 1999).
The Plaintiff was severely prejudiced by the court when it accepted the
defendants arguments. Firsdy, the Plaintiff did comply with Section 63-30-11 by
delivering said notices of claim to the governing bodies' respective councils.
Secondly, the court violated Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the
computation of time. The rule specifically disallows the inclusion of the "day of the
act, event, or default" in the computation of time. The court allowed such an inclusion
and found that the Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint timely by a day.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AS A MATTER
OF LAW-THE PLAINTIFF'S DELIVERY BY U.S. EXPRESS MAIL ON JUNE T\
1996 WAS THE APPROPRIATE DATE TO START THE COMPUTATION FOR A
SEPTEMBER 5. 1997 DEADLINE FOR FILING HIS COMPLAINT.
On or about June 9, 1995, the defendants, by and through agents,
auctioned Mr. Harward's personal property without just compensation in violation of a

6

Which the court should take judicial notice that the postmaster guarantees overnight delivery.

court order and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution. (R. at 3-4, 196198, 254; H. at 28). As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997), Mr.
Harward had prepared and delivered notices of claim to believed responsible
governmental entities, Utah County, Lehi City, Pleasant Grove City, and Provo City.
This was accomplished by not only serving them onto the city council, (R. at 118-130),
but onto their respective police chiefs. The Utah Supreme Court, in Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913) stated that the purpose of notice-of-claim
requirement is to require every claimant to state clearly all of the elements of his claims
to the board of commissioners or city council for allowance as a condition precedent to
his right to sue the city and recover his damages in an ordinary action.
Facing a one-year deadline, on June 6th, 1996, the Plaintiff chose a
courier who guaranteed over-night delivery by 10:30 a.m. (H. at 28).7 All of the
notices of claim were to have their respective notices of claim delivered to them on
June 7th, 1996. (R. at 155, 157; H. at 10). With the guarantee, it's presumed that the
notices were all delivered no later than that date and certainly within 3 days to the
deadline just as the 1997 version of Section 63-30-11 required. If not delivered by June
9th, 1996, further proceeding by Plaintiff would be time barred. Any claimant only has
one year to demand a claim. It's for this reason, the Plaintiff believed that he
7

Bruce Oliver, Plaintiffs attorney, debated between using U.S. Express Mail
service, UPS, Federal Express, Airborne Express, and DHL. He selected U.S. Express
Mail because the nearest post office was only a-half-a-block away located at 230 West 200
South.
10

substantially complied with Section 63-30-11. This Section read:
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim
were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by die person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney,
parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the
requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and
without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to
the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend
the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of
limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider
whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the
governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997).
In this matter, the Plaintiff complied with this provision to the letter. This
statute specifically deals with notice of claims and dealing with matters under the
Governmental Immunity Act. The focal point in this matter is the "delivery" to the
"responsible governmental bodies". This was accomplished by the Plaintiff timely.

ii

The date that the delivery was to be completed in light of the U.S. Express Mail
guarantee is that the delivered would be accomplished no later than 10:30 a.m.
following the date it was placed into the care of the courier-in this case it happened to
be the postmaster.
Because the Plaintiff chose the postmaster, the defendants were armed
with a shaky defense that this accomplished mailing and that pursuant to Section 63-371 et seq. the date of delivery was June 6th instead of June 7th. In this matter, defendants
are not entitled to the defense. Firstly, Section 63-30-11 is specific in nature and
Section 63-37-1 is a general one. Contrary to the defendants' arguments and the
court's conclusion, Section 63-37-1 is not controlling. The long-standing policy is that
"specific statutes control over more general ones," State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414
(Utah 1994). Since the issue at hand is whether their was compliance with the
immunity act any other provision dealing with mailing claims in general is not
controlling. However, Plaintiff would concede that such a general provision could
have been utilized by him however he would not be entitled to its protection unless
there was strict compliance with the provisions of Section 63-37-1 et seq. See Litster v.
Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this matter,
the Plaintiff did not attempt service under Section 63-37-1 et seq. Moreover, there was
no strict compliance of said provisions. Without strict compliance with the plain
language of the sections it cannot be applied to protect any party whether raised by the

12

defense or by the Plaintiff. In this case, the defense.
Section 63-37-1 et seq. provides:
Section 63-37-1. When Postmark date deemed filing date - When mailing date
deemed filing date.
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment
required or authorized to be filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any political
subdivision thereof, which is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed or made
and received by the state or political subdivisions on the date shown by the
post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate
wrapper containing it.
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivisions where received
and the cancellation mark is illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed
filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender establishes by
competent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document or payment was deposited in the United States mail on or before the
date for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any such report, tax
return, statement, or other document required by law to be filed, the sender files
with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after written
notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other document.
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail - Record as proof of delivery.
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or payment is
sent by United States mail and either registered or certified, a record
authenticated by the United States post office of such registration or certification
shall be considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax return,
statement or other document or payment was delivered to the state officer or
state agency or officer or agency of the political subdivision to which addressed,
and the date of registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked date.
63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document or making any such payment falls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday, such acts shall be considered timely if performed on the next business
13

day.
Id.
All of the defendants claimed that Plaintiffs delivery was June 6th, 1996
pursuant to 63-37-1. However, their arguments do not withstand the Litster Test. In
Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this
Court stated that there was "delineates a two-step process by which receipt can be
established." The Court went on to explain:
The document shall be deemed filed or made and received on the date it was
mailed if the sender establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, tax
return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the United
States mail on or before the date for filing or paying; and. . . the sender files
with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after written
notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other document.
Id. (Emphasis by the Court). In this matter, the Plaintiff was not relying on Section 6337-1 as was Litster. Litster was not allowed to claim mailing protection under Section
63-37-1 as the defendants in this should not be allowed. Reliance on Section 63-37-1 is
clearly misplaced. The Plaintiff did not send the notices of claim to the governmental
entities via certified or registered U.S. Mail. The Plaintiff intended their delivery to be
on June 7th, 1996 as required under Section 63-30-11. This is contrary to the
defendants claims; the defendants argued that the effective date of delivery should have
been June 6th, 1996. (R. at 110, 168, 205). This notion is wrong.
Moreover, "In determining whether the trial court properly found there
were no genuine material issues of fact, we review the facts in the light most favorable
14

to the losing party, while giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."
Promark Group. Inc. v. Harris Corp., 860 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah App. 1993); accord
Projects Unlimited. Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah
1990). In this matter, it is highly likely that this Court will find in favor of Mr.
Harward. In essence, the defendants are arguing that the trial court should grant them
summary judgment not for the Complaint being filed late but rather because they were
given one extra day notice prior to filing of the Complaint. This is not a fair and just
way of conducting government. The government cannot have their cake and eat it too!
kiLitster, the government won because Section 63-37-1 was not applied thereby
causing defective notice of claim. In this case, it is the government who is attempting
to use Section 63-37-1 to its favor. This time claiming that Mr. Harward filed his
claim on June 6th, 1996 and not by relying on Section 63-30-1, which specifically
mandates a "delivery." The statute fails to describe mailing or filing as specific
conduct necessary for complying with the notice requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Pursuant to Utah Law, under Section 63-30-14, the plaintiff must then
allow the governmental entities 90 days to accept liability. Once the 90 days expires or
when the entities otherwise deny liability, the plaintiff must file his suit within one year
from that date or face being time-barred. The date of the expiration is the question
before this Court. The defendants all claim that none of them admitted liability and

15

they all deny submitting to Plaintiff rejection letters. Thus, the only issue is when the
actual 90 days expired. (R. at 262). The defendants all claim that the 90-days expired
ninety-days from June 6th, 1996 or September 4th, 1996.8 Id.
The Plaintiff relying on the plain language of Section 63-30-11, requiring
their "delivery" to the governmental bodies did not consider the claims delivered until
June 7th, 1996. The delivery of said notices is specifically required by Section 63-30-11
to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff did
not rely on other general provisions outside of the Act. The defendants on the other
hand all argued that the Plaintiffs delivery of said notice was accomplished on June 6th,
1996 claiming Section 63-37-1 et seq. application. The court ultimately bought the
argument and concluded that Mr. Harward delivered his notices of claim on June 6th.
(H. at 48-50). However, as stated above, this notion is misplaced. In order for a party
to claim protection under Section 63-37-1, he needs to full compliance with the
provisions outlined in Section 63-37-2. The minimum requirements provide that the
documents need to be certified or registered mail delivered to the U.S. Mail with a
follow up within 30 days thereafter. (H. at 34). No such action was taken by the
Plaintiff for the defendants to seek protection under Section 63-37-1. As a matter of
fact, no defendant raised an affirmative defense a violation of Section 63-37-1. (H. at
8

Except for Pleasant Grove who interestingly attempts to purport even a need to
earlier file as soon as September 3rd, 1996. This argument was not adopted by the Court.
Such an argument disregarded the well-established computation rule not to include the date
of the "act, event, or default." See Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
16

25). Arguably, the defendants' failure to raise 63-37-1 as an affirmative defense may
constitute a waiver of said claim pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Nevertheless, still relying on the specific language of Section 63-30-11 the
Plaintiff understandably believed that he had until September 5, 1997 in which to file
his Complaint. (R. at 157). However, according to the defendants' claim and the
Court's adopted position, the complaint allegedly should have been filed with the court
on September 4th, 1997. But as the Court put it, "it appears to me that 63-37-1 does
control in this case." (H. at 48). The court, however, has erred.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Harward has been unjustly treated in this matter. The trial court
has erroneously imposed Section 63-37-1 against him which has unknowingly caused
him to lose a day in which to file his Complaint. This effect has time-barred him from
pursuing the merits of his claims. In has also caused him a deprivation of his
substantive right to due process. The Governmental Immunity Act specifically has
outlined the obligations of the claimant. Mr. Harward knew he had one year to file his
notice of claim. He did so with the intentions of them being "delivered" on June 7th,
1996 consistent with Section 63-30-11. Mr. Harward also knew he had 90 days from
that date to in which to wait for acceptance or rejection of the claim. If acceptance was

17

not made and there was no rejection within that time the claimant is to presume
rejection at the end of the 90 days. Finally, once that 90 days has expired, Mr.
Harward knew that he would have to file his Complaint within one year of that
rejection. In this case, that date would be September 5, 1997-the date he filed. At no
time prior to this was Mr. Harward ever on notice that he would have to file by
September 4th, 1997. Within the Governmental Immunity Act there is no reference to,
or even a suggestion that, he would be bound to the provisions contained within any
other general provisions. The mailing provisions of Sections 63-37-1 et seq. were not
attempted by Mr. Harward, nor did he comply with them. The court allowed the
defendants to apply Section 63-37-1, however this was erroneous. It is clear that the
defendants cannot show that the Plaintiff strictly complied with the plain language of
Section 63-37-1. As in Litster, in order for Section 63-37-1 to apply, there must be a
showing that Mr. Harward not only sent his claims via certified or registered mail, but
that Mr. Harward also followed the mailing within 30 days. The was not even the
case. Mr. Harward made suitable arrangements with a courier to effect delivery with
three entities to their councils and their police chiefs. There is no way that all of the
notice never made it to the governing bodies responsible.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31s1 day of
January, 2000.

/P.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant

PLAINTIFF'S ADDRESS:
HC 13 Box 389
Fairview, Utah 84629
(801) 427-3259
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Gregory J. Sanders
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Peter Stirba
Linette B. Hutton
STIRBA & HUTTON
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City
Attorneys for Utah County
Dale J. Lambert
Rebecca L. Hill
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Gary L. Gregerson
David C. Dixon
Gary A. McGinn
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603

Attorneys for Lehi City

Attorneys for Provo City

Dated this 31st day of January, 2000.
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ADDENDUM

Art. I, § 8

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

680

Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support t h e charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support t h e new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support t h e charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of t h e State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of t h e grand jury and t h e powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain t h e freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to t h e jury; a n d if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases t h e right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital -cases t h e jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, t h e Legislature
shall establish the rmmber ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases t h e verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors m a y find a Verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded. ,,
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to h i m i n his person,' property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; a n d no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions t h e accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by t h e
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by a n impartial jury of the county or
district in whicfythe offense is alleged to have been committed,
and t h e right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure t h e rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice p u t in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part a t any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896

Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896

Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably a n y franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896
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Section 3. Appropriation.
There is appropriated from the Commerce Service
Fund for fiscal year 1998-99:
(1) $3,500 to the Senate to pay for the
compensation and expenses of senators on the task
force;
(2) $5,000 to the House of Representatives to pay
for the compensation and expenses of
representatives on the task force; and
(3) $15,000 to the Office of Legislative Research
and General Counsel to pay for staffing the task
force.
Section 4. Repeal date.
This act is repealed November 30,1998.

S.B. 43
Passed 2/23/1998
Governor's Action: Sign 3/14/1998
Effective 5/04/1998
Laws of Utah 1998, Chapter 164

Governmental Immunity - Notice of
Claim
Sponsor: Michael G. Waddoups
AN ACT Relating to Governmental Immunity;
Modifying Provisions for Claims Against
Government Entities; and Making Technical
Corrections.
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:

person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered to [the response
governmental entity according to the requirement
of Section 63 30 12 or 63-30-13*]:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim h
against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against t
county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrate*
of the board, when the claim is against a school
district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when
the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against
the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, whenlhj
claim is against any other public board, commission;
or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age tf
majority, or mentally incompetent and without j
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, thj
claimant may apply to the court to extend the tinti
for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to tbi
governmental entity, the court may extend the turn
for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension thai
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant ai
extension, the court shall consider whether the delaj
in serving the notice of claim will substantiallj
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining
defense on the merits.
Section 2. Section 63-30-12 is amended to read:

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee Time for filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employ
AMENDS:
for an act or omission occurring during
63-30-11, as last amended by Chapter 76, Laws
performance of [hk] the employee's duties, wit]
of Utah 1991
the scope of employment, or under color
63-30-12, as last amended by Chapter 75, Laws
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filo
of Utah 1987
with the attorney general [and the agent
63-30-13, as last amended by Chapter 75, Laws
within one year after the claim arises, or before l_.
of Utah 1987
expiration of any extension of time granted undo
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not tfl
function giving rise to the claim is characterized ft£
Section 1. Section 63-30-11 is amended to read:
governmental.
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents
Section 3. Section 63-30-13 is amended to read:
- Service - Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or
its employee - Time for filing notice.
that would apply if the claim were against a private
A claim against a political subdivision, or againsg
person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a its employee for an act or omission occurring during
governmental entity, or against [an] its employee for the performance of [his] the employee's duties*!
an act or omission occurring during the performance within the scope of employment, or under color oj
of [his] the employee's duties, within the scope of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filc^
employment, or under color of authority shall file a with the governing body of the political subdivision
written notice of claim with the entity before according to the requirements of Section 63-3(M|
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not within one year after the claim arises, or before tb*
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized expiration of any extension of time granted undrf
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not thj
as governmental.
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
governmental.
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(in) the damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
<L*>
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63-28a-6

(2) The state planning coordinator shall review and forward
the comments and recommendations of the RDCC to:
(a) the governor;
(b) the initiating state agency, in the case of a proposed
state action; and
(c) the Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
1994
63-28a-6. Powers of state agencies and local governments not limited.
This chapter shall not limit powers conferred upon departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of state or local governments by existing law.
1981
63-28a-7. R e p e a l e d .

1994

Section
63-30-15.
63-30-16.
63-30-17.
63-30-18.
63-30-19.
63-30-20.
63-30-21.
63-30-22.

CHAPTER 29
UTAH STATE FIRE PREVENTION LAW
(Renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 220, §§ 1 to 22.)

63-30-23.
63-30-24.

63-29-1 to 63-29-27. Renumbered as §§ 63-27-101 to 6327-122.

63-30-25.

CHAPTER 29a

63-30*26.

LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS BOARD
(Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234,
§§ 324 to 338).

63-30-27.

63-29a-101 to 63-29a-112. Renumbered as §§ 53-7-302 to
53-7-316.

63-30-28.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-1.
63-30-2.
63-30-3.
63-30-4.

63-30-5.
63-30-6.
63-30-7.
63-30-8.
63-30-9.
63-30-10.
63-30-10.5.
63-30-10.6.
63-30-11.
63-30-12.
63-30-13.
63-30-14.

Short title.
Definitions.
Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Act provisions not construed as admission or
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of
employee — limitations on personal liability.
Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
Waiver of immunity as to actions involving
property.
Repealed.
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures.
Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous
or defective public building, structure, or
other public improvement — Exception.
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Waiver of immunity for taking private property without compensation.
Attorneys* fees for records requests.
Claim for injury,-f Notice — Contents —
Service — Legal disability.
Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
Claim againstrpoHticel subdivision or its employee - r Time for filing notice.
Claim for iftuiy;-^Approval or denial by
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63-30-29.
63-30-29.5.
63-30-30.
63-30-31.
63-30-32.
63-30-33.
63-30-34^
63-30-35.

63-30-36.
63-30-37.
63-30-38.

governmental entity or insurance carrier
within ninety days.
Denial of claim for injury — Authority and
time for filing action against governmental
entity.
Jurisdiction of district courts over actions —
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
Venue of actions.
Compromise and settlement of actions.
Undertaking required of plaintiff in action.
Judgment against governmental entity bars
action against employee.
Repealed.
Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited —
Governmental entity exempt from execution,
attachment, or garnishment.
Payment of claim or judgment against state —
Presentment for payment.
Payment of claim or judgment against political
subdivision — Procedure by governing body.'
Payment of claim or judgment against political
subdivision — Installment payments.
Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions.
Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment
of claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
Liability insurance—Purchase of insurance or
self-insurance by governmental entity autj
thorized — Establishment of trust accounts,
for self-insurance.
Repealed.
Liability insurance — Government vehicles,
operated by employees outside scope of employment.
Repealed.
Liability insurance — Construction of policy
not in compliance with act.
Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or
renewal.
Liability insurance — Insurance for employees
authorized — No right to indemnification oi
contribution from governmental agency. '
Limitation of judgments against governmental
entity or employee — Insurance coverage
exception.
Expenses of attorney general, general counse^
for state judiciary, and general counsel foij
the Legislature in representing the state, its
branches, members, or employees.
Defending government employee — Request
Cooperation — Payment of judgment.
Recovery of judgment paid and defense costsi
by government employee.
Indemnification of governmental entity by emi
ployee not required.

63-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah!
Governmental Immunity Act."
H**«
63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action fori
money or damages against a governmental entity <*M
against an employee.

&Q1
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(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's
officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a
board, members of a commission, or members of an
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance
with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated
in accordance with Section 53A-6-101, educational
aides, students engaged in providing services to
members of the public in the course of an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional health care
clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but
does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2Xa), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its
political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure
to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to
act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a
dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to
or los6 of property, or any other injury that a person may
suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if
inflicted by a private person or his agent.
'' (6) "Persoristllnjury" means an injury of any kind other
tnan property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town,
school district, .public transit. district, redevelopment
agency, special improvement or taxing district, or other
governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any
right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property,
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board,
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
1994
'GS-SO-S. I m m u n i t y of g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s f r o m s u i t .
&l

U) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following
state medical programs and services performed at a
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to
the core of governmental activity in this state and are
considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or
physician because of the high risk nature of the
patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and

63-30-5

dv) any other service or procedure performed at a
state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope
of their employment that a court finds is unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this
state.
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in'Tltle
62A, Chapter 4.
1991

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability!
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi1
cally provided, may be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental
entities or their employees.
(1?) jlf immunity from suty is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by
any waiver of immunity in this chapterr nor may any
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict
liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law,,
(3)1 (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter
against the employee or the estate of the employee whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through
^fraudor malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3Xc).
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which the governmental
entity may be Uable, but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
1991
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-3014, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.

63-30-6
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(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver the
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the
amount of available water.
1991
63-30-6. Waiver of i m m u n i t y a s t o a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g
property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for the
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adverse
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or other hen said entity may have or claim on the
property involved.
1965
63-30-7. R e p e a l e d .

1991

63-30-8. Waiver of i m m u n i t y for injury c a u s e d b y defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
highways, bridges, or other structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
1991
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous
or defective public building, structure, or
other public improvement — Exception.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building,
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 1991
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions*
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of
an employee committed within the scope of employment
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results
from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not
the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil
rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not
it is negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
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(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with an
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management
or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or
natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section
41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located
on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement;
(18) the activities of;
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; o^
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73, C o p t e r
5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition
to all other immunities granted by law.
1996
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity" for taking' private,
property without compensation.
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities isj
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmen-.
tal entity when the governmental entity has taken or dam*
aged private property for public uses without just compensa-1
tion.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according]
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
199Ji
tm

63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is;
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405
and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under S u b s e t
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petitiojg
for review under Section 63-2-404; and
^
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to ig
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brougnj
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in »
l99
subsequent action.
%
63-30-11.

Claim for injury — Notice — Contents
Service — Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations thai
would apply if the claim were against a private person begin*|
to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governs
mental entity, or against an employee for an act or on^ s l 0 JI
occurring during the performance of his duties, within'*Dfl
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£pe of employment, or under color of authority shall file a
litten notice df claim with the entity before maintaining an
tion, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to
w j claim is characterized as governmental.
~[3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.

63-30-22

(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1987
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions —
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over any action brought under this chapter, and such actions
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so
far as they are consistent with this chapter.
1983
63-30-17. Venue of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the
claim arose.
1983

63-30-18. Compromise a n d s e t t l e m e n t o f actions.
(1) Apolitical subdivision, after conferring with its legal
officer or o^her legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer,
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or
other relief sought.
1991
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative
S3-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time Services may:
for filing notice.
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less
kA claim against the state, or against its employee for an act
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk
or-omission occurring during the performance of'his duties,
^Management Fund mayJbe liable;
lyithin the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general
representative and the executive director of the Departfind the agency concerned within one year after the claim
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and settle
irises, or before the expiration of any extension of time
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the
banted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and
the < function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and
governmental.
1987 requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and
settling any claim of $100,000 or more.
^ 1995
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its emV* > . /ployee — Time for filing notice.
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff i n action.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its emAt the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity
governing body of the political subdivision within one year in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension to recover judgment. '
1965
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether ,
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 63-30-20. J u d g m e n t against governmental entity bars
governmental.
1987
action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial b y brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any
governmental entity or insurance carrier action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
within ninety days.
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental claim.
1965
entity or its insurance carrier shalj. aj^Jthereon and notify the*
&umant in writing of its. approved or piniat"A claim shall be 63-30-21. Repealed.
1978
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited
— Governmental entity exempt from execufoiled to approve or deny the claim.
1965
tion, attachment, or garnishment.
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the governt i m e for filing action against governmental
mental entity for exemplary or punitive damages.
entity.
^
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any
Tl) Tf the clainTy&denied, a claimant may institute an action
judgment entered against a state employee in the employ|&*thfe "district court-against'the "governmental entity or an
ee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or
^aployee of the entity.
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state
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would be required to pay the judgment under Section
63-30-36 or 63-30-37.
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue
against a governmental entity.
1991
63-30-23.

P a y m e n t of c l a i m or j u d g m e n t against state

— Presentment for payment.
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against the state
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to the office,
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by said instrumentahty is otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said
judgment or claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63-6-10.
1987

63-&0-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision — Procedure by governing
T>ody.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final
judgment obtained against a political subdivision "shall be
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith!
from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted'by law
or contract for other purposes.
1966
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision— Installment payments.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal sizet>r in
such otherrjnstallments as are agreeable to the claimant.
1965

63-30-26.. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a joint reserve fund,-for the
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operating
subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to*this
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all risks
created by this chapter.
1983
«i

63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims, judgments, or insurance pre1
miums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all
political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following:
(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an
elected official or employee of any political subdivision,
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitive
damages but the authority of a political subdivision for
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is
limited in any individual case to $10,000;
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or
judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments
as may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpose
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec. 5,
Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the
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maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No
levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable
value of taxable property. The revenues derived from this levy
may not be used for any other purpose than those stipulated in
this section.
1988
63-30-28.

Liability insurance — P u r c h a s e of i n s u r a n c e

or self-insurance by governmental entity authorized — Establishment of trust accounts
for self-insurance.
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may purchase
commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits
of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this
chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its
employee may be held liable.
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of selfinsurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with
respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a
trust account under the management of ari independent
private trustee having authority with respect to claims of
that character to expend both principal and earnings of
the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation,
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which the
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which
a compromise settlement may be agreed upon.
" (b) The monies and interest earned on said trust fund
shall be subject to investment pursuant to Titl^ 51,
Chapter 7, State Money Management Act of 1974, and
shall be* subject to audit by the state auditor.
, r>Zl
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust
agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee
may authorize the trustee to employ counsel) to defend actions
against the entity and its employees and to protect and
safeguard the assets of the trust, to provide for claims invest
tigation and adjustment Services, to employ expert witnesses!
andr consultants, and to provide such other services andl
functions necessary and proper to carry out the^purposes of
the trust.
199V
63-30-29. Repealed.
63-30-29.5.

1983

Liability i n s u r a n c e — G o v e r n m e n t vehicles

operated by employees outside scope of eni*
ployment.
l^
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by employ^
ees of the governmental entity with the express or implied
consent of the entity, but which, at the time liability is
incurred as a result of an automobile accident, is not beingj
driven and used within the course and scope of the driver'*
employment is considered to provide the driver with the
insurance coverage required by Title 41, Chapter 12a. How*
ever, the liability coverages considered provided are the niini^
mum limits under Section 31A-22-304.
1985
63-30-30. Repealed.

lfrjs

63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy
not in compliance with act.
Any insurance policy,rideror endorsement hereafter issuett
and purchased to insure against any risk which may arise air
a result of the application of this chapter, which contains any
condition or provision not in compliance with the require;
ments of the chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby,
but shall be construed and applied in accordance with such
conditions and provisions as would have applied had sucjjl
policy, rider or endorsement been in full compliance with thi#
chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid.
**$
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03-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase
or renewal.
No contract or policy of insurance may^be purchased or
renewed u n d e r this chapter except upon public bid to be let to
Ike lowest and best bidder; except that t h e purchase or
renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through
53-56-73.
1983

53-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized — No right to indemnification
or contribution from governmental agency.
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its
employees against liability, in whole or in part, for injury
or damage resulting from an act or omission occurring
during the performance of an employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of authority,
regardless of whether or not that entity is immune from
suit for that act or omission.
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public
purpose.
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance providing
coverage on behalf of a governmental entity or employee
for any liability defined by this section, regardless of the
source of funding for the coverage, the insurer has no
right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee for any loss or liability
covered by the contract or policy.
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its employee u n d e r any faithful performance surety bond h a s no
right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee for any loss covered by t h a t bond
based on a n y act or omission for which t h e governmental
entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under the
provisions of Section 63-30-36.
1991
63-30-34.

L i m i t a t i o n of j u d g m e n t s against g o v e r n m e n -

tal entity or employee — Insurance coverage
exception.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment
for damages for personal injury against a governmental
entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a
duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in any
one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in
any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment
to that amount.
(b) A court may not award judgment of more than
$250,000 for injury or death to one person regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is
characterized as governmental.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment
for property damage against a governmental entity, or an
employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to
indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the
court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the
damage is characterized as governmental.
(2) The damage limits established in this section do not
apply to damages awarded as compensation when a governmental entity h a s taken or damaged private property for
public use without j u s t compensation.
1991

63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel for
t h e Legislature in representing the state, its
branches, members, or employees.
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state agencies,
the state risk manager shall provide a comprehensive
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set forth in
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Section 63-30-34, that will protect the state and its
indemnified employees from claims and liability.
(b) The risk manager shall establish deductibles and
maximum limits of coverage in consultation with the
executive director of the Department of Administrative
Services.
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary
responsibility to provide legal representation to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of state government in cases where Risk Management Fund coverage
applies.
Ob) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide legal representation to the judicial or
legislative branches, the attorney general shall consult
with the general counsel for the state judiciary and with
the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their
assistance in defending their respective branch, and in
determining strategy and making decisions concerning
the disposition of those claims. The decision for settlement of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with
the attorney general and the state risk manager.
(3) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the
general counsel for the state judiciary, determines that
the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately
defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees
because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers
concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general counsel to separately
represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes independent legal representation of the state judiciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel
shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney
general in writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its
own counsel under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the state judiciary, its members, or
employees, where Risk Management Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary
and the state risk manager.
(4) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after
consultation with general counsel for the Legislature,
determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot
adequately defend the legislative branch, its members, or
employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the
Legislative Management Committee may direct its general counsel to separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent legal representation of the Legislature,
its members, or employees, the general counsel shall
notify the state risk manager and the attorney general in
writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by
its own counsel under this section, the decision for settlement of claims against the legislative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk Management Fund coverage applies, hes with the general counsel for the
Legislature and the state risk manager.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or
any other provision of this code, the attorney general, the
general counsel for the state judiciary, and the general
counsel for the Legislature may bill the Department of
Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their respective offices, including attorneys'
and secretarial salaries, m representing the state or any
indemnified employee against any claim for which the
Risk Management Fund may be liable and in advising
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state agencies and employees regarding any of those
claims.
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk
Management Fund for this purpose.
1990
§3-30-36. Defending government employee — Request
— Cooperation — Payment of judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall defend any action brought against its
Employee arising from an act or omission occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the employee shall make a written
request to the governmental entity to defend him:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon
him; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice
the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on
his behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with
notice requirements imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating to
the risk involved.
(6/ If the employee fails to make a request, or foils to
reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental
entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee,
nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against
the employee in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or
Subject to any court rule or order, decline to continue to
defend, an action against an employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or
, (iii) under color of authority;
(b), that the injury or damage resultedfromthefraudor
malice of the employee; or
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was
based resulted from:
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or
greater by weight than the established legal
limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined
influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled
substance as defined by Section 58-37-4.
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to
defend an employee, the governmental entity shall inform
the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense,
and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for its
refusal.
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not
admissible for any purpose in the action in which the
employee is a defendant.
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental
entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental
entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim.
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(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an
mployee under a reservation of rights under which the
governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment,
i? the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are established.
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects
the obligation of a governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5.
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or
declines to continue to defend, an action against its
employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection (3),
it shall still provide coverage up to the amount specified in
Sections 31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5.
1991
e

63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs
by government employee.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, which the
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30^6, the employee may recover from the governmental entity
the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred
i*i his defense.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of
^n employee against a claim, or conducts the defense under an
agreement as providecf in Su6sectibn 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from the governmental entity under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission
upon which the judgment is based occurred during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted1
the defense in good faith; and
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the!
injury or damage resulted from:
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee;
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being1 in)
actual physical control of a vehicle:
^
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to 0?
greater by weight than the established legal
limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle;
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally
impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined,
use of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled sub-,
stance as defined in Section 58-37-4.
M**
§3-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by
employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based
On or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the,
governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be
required to indemnify the governmental entity for the pa$
%ent.
***
CHAPTER 30a
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS TO]
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Section
*>3-30a-l.
*53-30a-2.

Definitions.
Indictment or information against officer or e ^
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(e) identify state or local government actions that have
Potential takings implications and, if appropriate, advise
those state or local government entities about those
^plications;
(f) provide information to private citizens, civic groups,
government entities, and other interested jDarties about
takings law and their rights and responsibilities under it;
**id
(g) if appropriate and requested to do so by one of the
Parties, mediate disputes between private property own, , % s and government entities that involve takings issues.
. ' The private property ombudsman may not represent
P ^te property owners, state agencies, or local governments
££. ^ r t or in adjudicative proceedings under Title 63, Chapter
»Administrative Procedures Act.
1997

,"- **14. Species Protection Account.
..' As used in this section, "species protection" means an
ac
°** to protect any plant or animal species identified as
by the state or as threatened or endangered under
tne
Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S.C. 16 Sec. 1531 et
seq.
' There is created within the General Fund a restricted
ac
??**nt known as the Species Protection Account.
' The account shall consist of:
(a) revenue generated Toy the brine shrimp tax provided
*br in Title 59, Chapter 23, Brine Shrimp Royalty Act; and
(b) interest earned on monies in the account.
(A
. 7 Monies in the account may be appropriated b y t h e
^ l a t u r e for the following purposes:
(a) to develop and implement species status assessments and species protection measures;
<&/ to adfam

6ib&gtcaf<<jgou<jas <rf{?£t?fki6ecf&pee?e&

Protection measures;
f (c) to conduct studies, investigations, and research into
\ e effects of proposed species protection measures;
* (d) to verify species protection proposals that are not
^ased on valid biological data;
(e) for Great Salt Lake wetlands mitigation projects in
%nnection with the western transportation corridor;
v (f) to pay for the state's voluntary contributions to the
Vtah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Account
vender the Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. L.
V 102-575, titles II-VI, lO^stat. 4605-4655; and
, (g) to pay for expenses of the State Tax Commission
finder Title 59, Chapter 23, Brine Shrimp Royalty Act.

(5}
(A\(A\ r^[ie Purposes specified'in Subsections (4)(a) through
{ * m a y be accomplished by the'state or, in a n appropriation
r> ' xie Legislature may authorize the Department of Natural
,
Wees to award grants to political subdivisions of the state
x ^ o m p l i s h those purposes.
, Monies in t h e account may not be used to develop or
, ^ ^ment a habitat conservation plan required under federal
, , .Unless the federal government pays for a t least Ys of the
Wt conservation plan costs.
1997
C H A P T E R 34a

( T e r m i n a t e d b y L a w s 1977, c h . 234, § 10.)
63

" 3 1 a - l t o 63-34a-9.

Terminated.
C H A P T E R 35

SOCIAL

SERVICES

( R e p e a l e d b y L a w s 1988, c h . 1, § 407.)

63-3£ -1 to 63-35-13. Repealed.

UjSNJSKAIj

CHAPTER 35a
SOCIAL SERVICE

LICENSURE

( R e p e a l e d b y L a w s 1988, c h . 1, § 407.)
e3

*b.J

to 63-35a-16.

Repealed.

CHAPTER 36
INDIAN AFFAIRS
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241,
§§ 342 to 367.)
Secti(

Qn

5|j1jkl to 63-36-8. Repealed.
£Tq^9 to 63-36-21. Renumbered.
W
~*M01 to 63-36-213. Renumbered.
63

" 3 ^ 1 to 63-36-8. Repealed.

™^9

1991

to 63-86-21. Renumbered as §§ 63-36-201 to 6336-213.

1991

^ " ^ I O I to 63-36-213. Renumbered as §§ 9^9-101 to
9-9-213.

1992

CHAPTER 36a
TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS
(Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 218, § 1.)
* * % - / to63-36a-4.

Repealed

mi

CHAPTER 37*
MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS,
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO
STATE OR POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS
Sectii

l*n
63-3?,
63

3

~ ^2.

63-3>

3.

When postmark date deemed filing date -*- Vfhen
mailing date deemed filing date.
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of
delivery.
Filing date Jailing on Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.

M . When postmark date deemed filing-date '—
*
When mailing date deemed filing date.''
or an re P° rt » ^^m*tax return, statement or other document
,, e^SV payment required or authorized to be filed or made to
. . ^ate of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which
* (1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall
**e deemed filed or made and received by the state or
*\>titical subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office
mediation mark stamped upon the envelope or other
ppropriate wrapper containing it.
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political
.,ibdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is
legible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or
lade and received on the date it was mailed if the sender
'stablishes by competent evidence that the report, claim,
ax return, statement or other document or payment was
. eposited in the United States mail on or before the date
>rfilingor paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any
uch report, tax return, statement, or other document
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required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days
after written notification is given to the sender by the
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such
report, tax return, statement, or other document
1967

63-37-2. Registered or certified mail — Record as proof
of delivery.
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United
States post office of such registration or certification shall be
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax
return, statement or other document or payment was delivered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of
registration or certificatioa shall be deemed the postmarked
date.

1967

63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday.
' If the date for filing' any such report, claim, tax return,
-statement or other document or making any such payment
/alls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, such acts shall
be considered timely if performed on the next business day.
1967
CHAPTER 38
fefi

fcUDGETARY

Section
,,63-38-1.
63-38-1.1.
63-38-1.2.
63-38-1.3,

63-38-1.4.

63-38-2.

63-38-2.5.

63-38-2.8.
63-38-3.
63-38-3.2,,

63-38-3.5.
63-38-4.
63-38-5.
63-38-6.
63-38-7.

63-38-8.

PROCEDURES ACT

Short title,
State Budget Office — Creation — Duties and
responsibilities, t
State budget officer—Appointment—Responn #ibilities-*-^ Compensation.
S t a t e budgejt* officer's -xluty^to provide staff
support &nd, advise gpyerjaor with regard to
work programs.
. ?
Governor's authority to combine functions of
State Budget Office and Office of State Plan* ning Coordinator.
Governor to submit budget to Legislature —
Contents — Preparation — Appropriations
based on'current tax laws and not to exceed
estimated revenues.
Establishing a Budget Reserve Account — Providing for deposits and expenditures from
the account.
Repealed.
Appropriations governed by chapter — Restrictions on expenditures — Transfer of funds.
Fees -*- Adoption, procedure, and approval —
Establishing and assessing fees without legislative approval.
^Internal service funds — Governance and review.
Duplicate payment of claims prohibited.
Appropriations from special funds or accounts
— Transfer by proper official only.
Warrants — Not to be drawn until claim processed — Redemption.
Cash funds — Petty cash, application for —
Cash advances — Revolving fund established by law excepted.
End of fiscal year — Unexpended balances —
Funds not to be closed out — Pending claims

— Transfer of amounts from item of appropriation.

Section
63-38-8.1.
63-38-9.
63-38-9.5.
63-38-10.
63-38-11.
63-38-12.
63-38-13.
63-38-14.
63-38-15.
63-38-16.
63-38-17.
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Nonlapsing authority.
Revenue types — Disposition of funds collected
or credited by a state agency.
Agencies exempt from act.
Overexpenditure of budget by agency — Prorating budget income shortfall.
Director of finance to exercise accounting control — Work programs — Allotments and
expenditures.
Uniform School Fund — Appropriations.
Conditions on appropriations binding.
Request for in-depth budget review of agency
or program — Form of budget submitted.
Purpose of review — Information submitted.
Selection of activities for review — Coordina' tion with audits.
Repealed.

63-38-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Budgetary
Procedures Act."
1969

63-38-1.1. State Budget Office — Creation — Duties
and responsibilities.
There is created an office to be known as the State Budget
Office attached to the office of the governor. The State Budget
Office shall assist t h e governor in t h e preparation of the state
budget and perform such duties a n d responsibilities as may be
assigned by the governor or as are contained withiti this act.
1979

63-38-1.2. State budget officer — Appointment — Responsibilities — Compensation.
The state budget office shall be under the:; supervision,
direction/ and control of an officer known as the state budget
officer. The state budget officer shall be responsible for carrying out the governor's directions with regard to the preparation of the state budget in conformance with the specifications
of this chapter. The state budget officer shall be appointed by
the governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.
The governor shall establish the state budget officer's salary
within the salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67,
Chapter 22, State Officer Compensation.
1991
63-38-1.3. State budget officer's duty to provide staff
support and advise governor with regard to
work programs. j
The state budget officer, under t h e direct supervision of the
governor, shall provide appropriate staff support to assist in
the preparation of the state budget specified in Section 6338-2. The state budget officer shall also advise the governor
with regard to approval or revision of agency work programs
as specified in Section 63-38-11.
1979.
63-38-1.4. Governor's a u t h o r i t y t o c o m b i n e functions
of S t a t e B u d g e t Office a n d Office of State
P l a n n i n g Coordinator.
The governor m a y combine the functions of the State
Budget Office with the functions of the Office of the State
Planning Coordinator, if in the governor's judgment,^such
combination will provide improved staff support and policy
advice on both budgetary and nonbudgetary matters.
1979

63-38-2. Governor to submit budget to Legislature —
Contents — Preparation — Appropriations
based on current tax laws and not to exceed
estimated revenues.
(1) (a) The governor shall, within three days after the
convening of the Legislature in the annual general session, submit a budget for t h e ensuing fiscal year by

Rule 6

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

—Default judgment.
Appeal.
Cited.
Filed depositions
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court
are presumptively public under the Utah Public and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be
kept secret only on a showing of good cause.
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d
1095 (Utah 1990).
Service upon attorney
—Presumption of authorization
Where defendant engaged attorney only to
file motion but never so notified court or attorney, appearance of attorney to file motion
raised presumption that he represented defendant in full action. Where defendant presented
no clear and convincing evidence to refute presumption, notice given to attorney of date set
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v.
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 R2d 454 (1966).
When service required
—Default judgment
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants of default judgment entered against
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656

16

P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985
addition of reference to Rule 55).
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the
default judgment when defendants received the
notice of default in time to move to set aside the
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins Co. v. D.T.
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Appeal
Under former Rule 73(h),^time for appeal
from default judgment in city court runs from
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v.
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d).
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P2d 806
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual

place of abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Service of process by mail in international
civil action as permissible under Hague Convention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begjns to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed, after including any additional time under subsection (e),
is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall
be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or

expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it.
(d) For motions —Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may
for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at
some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1999
amendment to subdivision (a) conforms the
state rule to the federal rule. The amendment
also makes it clear that weekends and holidays
will be included in the computation of time only
if the relevant periods including the three-day
mailing period under subsection (e), is 11 days
or more.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment inserted "by CJA 4-50 V in the first sentence of Subdivision (d).
The 1999 amendment inserted "after including any additional time under subsection (e)w
and substituted "11 days" for "seven days" in
the last sentence in Subdivision (a).
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b),
(d), and (e) of this rule are substantially similar
to Rule 6, F.R.C.P.
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b),
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Cross References. — Amendment to pleadings to conform to evidence, time of motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, time of service,
U.R.C.P. 4(b).
Corporation or association, mailing of process
to, U.R.C.P. 4(e)(5).
Depositions, objections to errors and irregularities, U.R.C.P. 32(c).
Discharge of attachment or release of property, U.R.C.P. 64C(f).

Documents for state or subdivision, filing
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3.
Election laws, weekends and holidays included in computation of time, § 20A-1-401.
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge,
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21.
Juvenile Court Act, time computed according
to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27.
Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2.
New trial, time of motion for, after judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, U.R.C.P. 5<XcX2).
Order defined, U.R.C.P. 7(b)(2).
Pleadings and other papers, service by mail,
U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1).
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing,
§ 75-1-401.
Reference to master, time of first meeting of
parties after, U.R.C.R 53(d)(1).
Relief from judgment or order, time for motion, U.R.C.P. 60.
Rules by district courts, U.R.C.P. 83.
Service by mail, U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1).
Substitution of parties, time of motion for,
U.R.C.P. 25.
Summons mailed as alternative to personal
service, U.R.C.P. 4(g*.
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7.
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdiction, notice, U.R.C.P. 65B(e).
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely
filing, U.R.C.P. 12(k).
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional time after service by mail.
—Administrative procedure.
—Failure to add days.
Waiver of objection.
—Industrial Commission.
Computation.
—Months and years.
—Sundays.
Enlargement.
—Motion for new trial.
—Notice of appeal.
Designation of record.
—Redemption from execution sales.
Motions and affidavits.

—Applicability of rule.
Court orders.
New trial.
—Compliance with rule.
Actual notice.
Ineffective notice.
Time to prepare.
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Cited.
Additional time after service by mail
—Administrative procedure
Subdivision (e) does not apply to extend the

